Stability and Change in Constitutional Law by Williams, Jerre S.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 17 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1963 Article 17 
12-1963 
Stability and Change in Constitutional Law 
Jerre S. Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jerre S. Williams, Stability and Change in Constitutional Law, 17 Vanderbilt Law Review 221 (1963) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol17/iss1/17 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Stability and Change in Constitutional Law
lerre S. Williams*
[A] constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.'
This characterization of the role of the United States Constitution
by the great Chief Justice one hundred and forty-four years ago ac-
curately sets the scene for a consideration of stability and change in
constitutional law. To have viewed the United States Constitution as
a code would have been contrary to the entire common-law tradition
out of which it grew. Instead, as this quotation reveals, it has never
been seen as establishing a set, unchangeable meaning. The history
of constitutional interpretation in the United States reveals that
Pound's famous dictum, 'law must be stable and yet it cannot stand
still,"2 is not limited to the development of statutory law or adminis-
trative edict.
An evaluation of stability and change in constitutional law must
have as its theme the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis in
the interpretation and application of the Constitution. It could argua-
bly be said that the sole means of change in constitutional law
is provided in the amending process set up in article V of the great
charter itself. But the difficulties in amending the Constitution are
such that neither the Supreme Court nor the dominant political forces
have ever taken the position that change in constitutional law can
take place only through amendment and not through altered Court
interpretation and application.
This proposition is so firmly grounded in our constitutional law
that it would be unworthy of further discussion if it were not for the
fact that there seems to be a widespread misunderstanding of this
established and accepted role of the Supreme Court in molding and
adapting the Constitution to the needs of each new day. Objection
has been so frequently raised in recent years to the overruling of
prior constitutional principles by the Supreme Court that some re-
evaluation is necessary.
A clear distinction must be drawn between objection to current
constitutional interpretation on the ground that it is wrong, and
objection on the ground that current interpretation abandons prior
0 Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. Marshall, C. J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 203 (1819).
2. PoUND, INTERPRETATIONs OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
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established principle. Objection to a constitutional interpretation
on the ground that it is wrong is always legitimate and acceptable
but must compete on its own merits with the quality of the new
decision which has been made and the opinion which has been
written. But objection on the ground that a current interpretation
abandons prior established law must be evaluated in a wholly dif-
ferent way. This is not to say that objection solely on the ground
that prior law has been abandoned is not proper in some cases. It is
simply to stress the fact that considerations which lead to an effective
evaluation of current constitutional interpretations differ widely, de-
pending on whether the objection is to the merits of the interpreta-
tion or simply to the fact that it alters a prior rule.
The tendency to combine and confuse the two separate issues often
leads to a serious misevaluation of the proper role of the Supreme
Court in interpreting and applying the Constitution. The subject of
this paper requires that it be limited to an evaluation of the proper
role of the Court in instances where an interpretation of the Consti-
tution has already been established by prior decision. The Court is
not writing on a clean slate but is faced with a prior decision now
being challenged as a statement of constitutional principle which
should be abandoned.
There is no need here to go into a detailed consideration of the
established application of stare decisis which allows the Supreme
Court, in proper cases, to overrule prior decisions and strike out upon
new paths. Analysis of the cases involving such instances has been
accomplished many times elsewhere.3 The reporting and considera-
tion of such cases has been effectively made by the Court itself in
two leading opinions. The first of these is the dissenting opinion by
Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co.,4 and the
second is Justice Reed's majority opinion in Smith v. Allwright.5
Justice Brandeis, in footnotes to his opinion,6 lists a total of approxi-
mately forty instances where the United States Supreme Court over-
ruled prior decisions, up to the date of the case, 1932. Justice Reed,
in the opinion for the Court in Smith v. Allwright, adds an additional
fifteen cases7 in the twelve years which had elapsed between his
3. E.g.,. Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and tiw Extent
to Which It Should Be Applied, 21 WAsH. L. REv. 158 (1946); Covington, Tho
American Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 190 (1946); Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 COLuM. L. REv. 735 (1949); Reed, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law,
Pa. Bar Ass'n. Q., No. 35, April 1938, p. 131; Precedent and the Constitution, 3 RACE
REL. L. REP. 395 (1958).
4. 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932).
5. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
6. 285 U.S. at 406-08 nn.1&2 (1932).
7. 321 U.S. 665 n.10 (1944).
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opinion and that of Justice Brandeis. Without need to carry the count
forward, we know that the process continues.
Two brief observations can serve to show the breadth of the
doctrine of the acceptability of overruling prior constitutional cases.
The first is that the prior decision being overruled may be recent or
of long standing. Without regard to the current instances which
have engendered so much controversy, overruling prior decisions can
involve an earlier decision which was decided only a year before,
as in the Legal Tender Cases in 1871,8 or can involve the overruling
of a precedent nearly 100 years old, as in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins in
1938.9
The second observation centers upon the fact that the accepta-
bility of the reexamination of constitutional decisions was solidly
established early in constitutional history. A feel for the Court's
attitude is shown by Chief Justice Taney in The Genesee Chief, in
1851, overruling a prior constitutional principle established in 1827:
"And as we are convinced that the former decision was founded in
error, and that the error, if not corrected, must produce serious public
as well as private inconvenience and loss, it becomes our duty not
to perpetuate it."10 Indeed, the right and duty of the Court to re-
examine precedent has always been so well accepted and well
established that Thayer, writing in 1908, said: "[A]s one looks back
over our history and the field of political discussions in the past ...
he seems to see the whole region strewn with the wrecks of the
Constitution-of what people have been imagining and putting for-
ward as the Constitution.""
Lest this brief statement of the doctrine that it has always been
acceptable for the Supreme Court to overrule its prior decisions be
taken as an indication that precedent should have no utility, let it
be said that the Court has always accepted the proposition that the
following of precedent should be the rule rather than the exception.'
2
And here again the pattern of the common-law tradition is analogous.
Yet, treating the principle of following prior decisions as the rule and
the overruling of prior decisions as exceptional does no more than
pose the critical issue. This issue, of course, is the evaluation in a
given case as to whether a prior decision should be followed or
should be shorn of its vitality either through the process of overruling
it or distinguishing it away.
8. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 471, 478 (1851).
11. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 158 (1908).
12. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
406 (1932).
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The fact of the existence of the principle that prior decisions need
not be followed in all instances is easy to establish. But when the
search is begun for the guiding considerations which determine in
a given case whether precedent should rule or not, the principles
become difficult and obscure. Roscoe Pound, in his prescient wisdom,
declared: "If we seek principles, we must seek principles of change
no less than principles of stability." 3
It is not surprising that "principles of change" are difficult to
extract and have been stated only in the broadest of generalities,
which actually have been statements of conclusions rather than
guides. A brief mention of a few of these generalities, limited to
those appearing in opinions of the Supreme Court, can reveal the
nature of the problem. Thus, the Court has said that decisions should
be followed "unless clearly erroneous." 14 Again, a decision should not
be disturbed except for "the most cogent reasons."15 Stare decisis
may not prevail over a "system of justice based on a considered and a
consistent application of the Constitution." 6 Does the prior precedent
collide "with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
sounder, and verified by experience"?17 "Time and circumstances"
may have "drained" a prior case "of vitality." 8
Probably the most accurate view of the nature of the process of
the Court in deciding whether a prior decision should be overruled
or not is to recognize that there must be balancing of the disadvan-
tages and dislocations resulting from the overruling as opposed to the
disadvantages and dislocations of maintaining the prior decision, once
it is determined by the judges that they feel the prior decision is
wrong.' 9 Max Radin characterized the problem most succinctly,
perhaps, when he said, "[N]either following nor disregarding a prece-
dent is as easy as it seems."20
The enforced following of precedent means that judges may create
law which is virtually immune from change. It means that an earlier
generation may create a rigid legal structure which cannot stand
the stresses of growth and development in society. It could even
mean that a court could subvert the Constitution by erroneous
decisions,' since it cannot be assumed that a prior decision is any
13. POuND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1.
14. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1865).
15. National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, 102 (1881).
16. Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657, 665 (1942).
17. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
18. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 144 (1940).
19. Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 580
(1944) (dissenting opinion).
20. Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 137, 139 (1946).
21. Covington, supra note 3, at 198.
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more correct than the new decision.22 'On the other hand, failure to
respect the wisdom of past considerations can destroy a continuity
in law, and encourage disregard for the law, even the fundamental
law, because it may be changed tomorrow.
I.
What are the principles of stability and change? There can be -no
attempt here to create an exhaustive analysis. Rather, an enumera-
tion of a number of factors, together with brief comments upon
them, is all that can be attempted. In making such an enumeration,
it should be recognized that each principle stated contains both
elements demanding stability and elements demanding change. Each
factor contains its own built-in safeguard against the abuse of the
power to abandon precedent. By the same token, each consideration
contains within it elements which urge that prior decisions not be
controlling in proper cases.
There are at least nine intrinsic considerations which can be isolated
as they relate to the particular legal issue involved in the case which
is to be decided. Then, there are at least three extrinsic considera-
tions which relate in general to the issue concerning the abandon-
ment of past precedent. The intrinsic considerations will be briefly
enumerated and commented upon first.
(1) The ease or difficulty of the correction of past error by other
branches of the government is of particular concern. The Supreme
Court urges that a constitutional precedent is less subject to the
doctrine of stare decisis than precedent which may be altered by
legislation.2 At first glance, this doctrine is a startling one since it
means that the fundamental law is more subject to being overruled
by the Court than is statutory law. It is the very fact that constitu-
tional law is not subject to easy change which has led the Court to
establish this firm principle.
This is not to say, however, that courts should never overrule
prior decisions when the possibility of legislative correction is present.
In his dissenting opinion in the Burnet case, Justice Brandeis cites at
least fifteen instances where the Supreme Court overruled cases even
though error could have been corrected by legislation.24 Insight into
the justification for the Court's overruling of precedent even in cases
22. Wood v. Brady, 150 U.S. 18, 23 (1893): "[C]ourts are bound in their very
nature to declare what the law is and has been, and not what it shall be in the future,
and . . if they were absolutely bound by their prior decisions, they would be without
the power to correct their own errors."
23. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
24. 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).
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where the legislature could accomplish change was given most
effectively by Paul Freund when he said: "The legislature's inaction
may reflect satisfaction with the fluidity of the judicial process rather
than with the particular precedent."25
(2) The distinction between the "interpretation of the Constitution
to extract the principle itself' and the "application of a constitutional
principle" has been stressed by both Justices Brandeis2 and ReedY'
The consideration is that constitutional principles themselves remain
virtually unyielding but that the application of these principles in
given cases is more freely subject to change. The Court has never
sufficiently articulated this distinction in an opinion by explanation
or example, although Justice Brandeis did give us the example of the
due process clause and the process of determining whether a particular
statute is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.2 But Justice Reed, in
an address, became more precise when he gave as examples of the
constitutional principles themselves such matters as the power of the
Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, the commerce
clause as a limitation upon the power of the states, the power of the
Supreme Court to review state decisions upon federal questions, the
doctrine of dual sovereignty, the separation of powers, and the
principle of federal supremacy.2 He refers to only one instance in
recent years where the Court extracted a principle anew from the
Constitution. This was in the case of United States v. Butler,20 which
adopted the broader interpretation of the general welfare clause to
the effect that it is an additional grant of power to the federal
government to spend money for the general welfare over and beyond
the other powers to regulate. Justice Reed then went on to say that
the application of these principles to particular cases is "properly and
continuously subject to critical reexamination. 31
(3) The extent to which circumstances have changed since the
earlier decision has been one of the most commonly stated reasons
why an earlier decision may lose its force as precedent. Chief Justice
Taft in Stafford v. Wallace referred to the extension of the federal
commerce power to stockyards and meatpackers in 1922 as "the
natural development of interstate commerce under modem condi-
tions."m And Chief Justice Taney in The Genesee Chief, in overruling
25. FRuND, ON UNDEnSTANDING THE SREME COURT 38 (1949).
26. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410 (1932).
27. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
28. Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., supra note 26, at 410.
29. Reed, supra note 3, at 139.
30. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
31. Reed, supra note 3, at 140.
32. 258 U.S. 495, 518 (1922); cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
390 (1937) ("the economic conditions which have supervened" are one justification
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an earlier decision which had restricted the federal power so as not
to apply to internal navigable waters, stressed that the earlier decision
had been made "when the commerce on the rivers of the west and
on the lakes was in its infancy, and of little importance, and but little
regarded compared with that of the present day."33 The extent to
which changes in our society demand the "adapting" of the Constitu-
tion (using Marshall's word)m clearly are of significant value in
evaluating the binding effect of past precedents.
(4) The quality and persuasiveness of the opinion in a case over-
ruling a prior decision is obviously of importance in evaluating the
determination by the Court to overrule. The Justice, feeling a par-
ticular precedent should be abandoned, might well test his decision to
overrule by exploring his ability to write a persuasive opinion.
Too often, the value of this particular consideration has been
neglected, especially in recent years. We have been treated time and
time again to the spectacle of commentators and the press generally
attacking decisions without reference to the scope of those decisions
as set forth in the opinions, or without regard to the quality and
persuasiveness of the opinions in establishing the need for changes in
the law.
Three examples should suffice to make the point. In reference to
the school integration decision, Brown v. Board of Education,35 little
mention has been made of the emphasis by the Court on the fact that
at the time of the adoption of the equal protection of the laws clause,
public school education had only a fragmentary existence compared
to the extent it permeates our social structure today. The Court's
decision in Jencks v. United States36 was popularly characterized as
forcing the "throwing open of the files of the FBI" so that Communists
and their attorneys could go rummaging around in them. But the
decision, as anyone who read the opinion carefully could not escape
seeing, was much narrower. It simply required that prior statements
made by witnesses used by the government in trials be made availa-
ble to the defendants in those same trials so that proper cross-
examination as to the trustworthiness of the witnesses could be carried
out. A third example can be found in the overly broad conclusions
concerning the scope of the Supreme Court's decisions relating to
prayer and bible reading in the public schools.37 The decisions obvi-
for giving the constitutional issue "fresh consideration").
33. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 471, 485 (1851).
34. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 203 (1819), set out at p.
221 supra.
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).




ously do not bar invocations at public meetings, voluntary bacca-
laureate services, Christmas trees in public schools, and the like.38
(5) The opposite of the preceding factor is the extent to which
the earlier case being reexamined was well or poorly presented and
developed by counsel and the persuasiveness of the Court's opinion.39
Failure to heed the relevance of this consideration constitutes a denial
of the role of the adversary system and the proper respect for the
qualities of the advocate. The constitutional principle could have
been established in a certain way simply because the lawyer who
argued for that application was far more effective to the Court than
the lawyer who argued the opposite point of view. In many instances,
also, important constitutional law has been made in cases between
two private parties who were themselves concerned only with the
winning of the particular dispute in which they were involved and
not with the ultimate principles which might be established.40 Such
considerations make most relevant the evaluation of the precedent
for its quality. On the other side, it need hardly be said that a
precedent established by a noted Justice or through the advocacy of
a great lawyer may discourage reexamination. 41
(6) The need for having a rule of law settled is sometimes far more
important than that it be settled the way the judge who is considering
the rule feels is the best way. This is particularly so in commercial law
and property law, where having the rule established so that people
can rely upon it is a prime consideration. 2 The Supreme Court
38. These conclusions are reached in an extraordinarily balanced and effective opinion
of the Attorney General of Massachusetts dated August 20, 1963. This opinion is
summarized in a Joint Memorandum of the American Jewish Committee Institute of
Human Relations and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith dated September 4,
1963.
39. In The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 471 (1851), the Court,
in overruling a prior decision, said: "[W]e are convinced that, if we follow it, we
follow an erroneous decision into which the court fell, when the great importance of
the question as it now presents itself could not be forseen; and the subject did not
therefore receive that deliberate consideration which at this time would have been given
to it by the eminent men who presided here when that case was decided." Id. at 484,
See also Covington, supra note 3, at 198. The Court has also referred to the close vote
in an earlier case as making the overruling of it perhaps somewhat more justified. United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379,390 (1937).
40. In the Judiciary Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1958), provision was made for
governmental intervention in suits between private parties which involve the consti-
tutionality of federal legislation. Passage of this law reflected dissatisfaction with the
device of leaving constitutional litigation wholly in the hands of private litigants. Legis-
lation, 38 CoLum. L. REV. 153 (1938).
41. The extreme reluctance of the Court to overrule a questionable decision by
Chief Justice Marshall is quite evident in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), which upheld a statute extending diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts to citizens of the District of Columbia.
42. Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. W. A. Gaines & Co., 246 U.S. 312, 320 (1918);
Wallace v. McConnell, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 124, 136-37 (1839).
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recognizes the importance of this truism. As Justice Brandeis said
in his opinion in the Burnet. case, "[I]n most matters it is more im-
portant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right."4
(7) A step beyond the preceding consideration is the recognition
that established principles sometimes involve vested rights of property
or contract which would be undermined by a new decision. Chief
Justice Taney referred to the absence of any vested rights in the
Genesee Chief case which has previously been quoted. 44 In cases
where property has been acquired or contracts made in reliance on
a rule, overruling is much more difficult to justify.
45
(8) Justice Brandeis, in his opinion in the Burnet case, referred to
the use of the process of "trial and error" as appropriate to the judicial
function.46 His suggestion should not be taken as advocacy of a license
to the Court to experiment without limitation or responsibility. But
it does point up a significant factor which is often overlooked. Since
the principle of stare decisis as applied by the Supreme Court in
constitutional law allows room for the overruling of precedent, this in
turn means that a decision overturning prior law can itself be over-
turned if it fails. In another way, this is simply to say that the new
decision overruling a prior case does not itself now become binding
forever; it also is subject to reexamination and reconsideration under
all of the factors here enumerated.
This abandoning of precedent with a later return to it is seen in
the early recognition by the Court of the right of intensive govern-
ment control, including regulation of prices, over businesses outside
the area of the traditional public utility.47 Then, there came the period
in the earlier years of this century when only those businesses which
did fit the common-law pattern of a public utility were subject to
stringent price and other governmental controls.4 Finally, there was
the return to the earlier doctrine in 1934 in Nebbia v. New York,
which authorized detailed governmental price control in the milk
industry in New York.49
(9) Finally, perhaps as a summary of the other factors, the history
43. 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).
44. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 471, 487 (1851). See also Washington v. W. C. Dawson
& Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (dissenting opinion).
45. But vested rights of property do not constitute a legal obstacle to overruling a
prior decision if the Court is convinced overruling is indicated. Dunbar v. City of
New York, 251 U.S. 516, 518 (1920).
46. 285 U.S. 393, 408 (1932).
47. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
48. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Williams v. Standard
Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
49. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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of constitutional law shows a development in the direction of what
can be called a striving toward the American ideals of liberty and
justice for all. The clearest example of this is the historical evaluation
of cases in the area of fair procedures as part of due process of law.
A pattern of development over many years in the direction of greater
protection of individual rights surely can be seen. This development
is, of course, precisely the same kind as takes place in the common law
itself. This is as it should be since due process of law is a common-law
concept, and there never has been any indication that the framers
of the Constitution felt they were freezing the concept into an
unchangeable mold. A much more accurate interpretation of what
is involved in a constitutional provision such as due process of law
is that the framers intended to insure that the principle continue as
part of the developing common law of this country and continue to
be subject to the growth and vitality which characterized its develop-
ment in Britain.
The extrinsic factors which are applicable to cases generally, rather
than a particular case, are not as subject to separation. But perhaps
three of them can be given sufficiently different emphasis to justify
enumeration.
(1) Of obvious relevance, as is revealed by the entire theme of
the evaluation of stability and change, is the history and tradition of
the common law. The doctrine of stare decisis was not a doctrine
which required the slavish following of precedent until long after the
American common law had broken off from the British common law
and was subject to its own development.50 It was not until the end of
the nineteenth century that the House of Lords in the London Street
Tramways case took the firm position that it had to follow prior
decisions.51 Also relevant is the fact that this British principle is not
subject to the possibility of stultification of the law that a similar rule
applied in the United States Supreme Court would create. Any legal
principle in Britain is subject to change by legislation by the House
of Commons; even British constitutional principles are subject to this
statutory alteration.
Yet on the other side, while the doctrine of stare decisis does not
require that precedents always be followed, it is inescapable that the
history and tradition of the common law requires that earlier decisions
normally will be followed. Good reason must be found to overrule
them.52 This part of the history and tradition of the common law is
every bit as important as the part which does allow the overruling
50. Radin, supra note 20, at 155.
51. London Street Tramways, Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375.
52. CAuRozo, THE NATURE OF =HE JUDICIAL PiocEss 149 (1921).
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of precedents when the Court is convinced that they must be over-
ruled.
(2) Of the utmost importance in extrinsic considerations controlling
the extent to which prior decisions shall be followed is the quality of
the judges who are making the decisions. The point is obvious. A
judge who is well trained in the American and common-law traditions,
and who is objective and balanced in his approach to issues, obviously
garners greater trust in making his decisions, which in the end must
be so subjective.
The accepted power of courts to overrule decisions argues for
continuing wisdom in selecting judges. Yet, the power to overrule can
save us from the errors of the inadequate judge whom we are bound
to get sometimes no matter how careful the selection.
(3) The pressures of public opinion and from the political branch
of the government are inescapably and properly present. It has been
said often enough that judges are human, and it would be tragic if
they did not have the human qualities which make them susceptible
to some extent to pressures from various sources. To a degree, but
not completely, the judges should "follow the election returns," or
they lose touch with the current mores of society. The balance which
must be achieved by the judge in objectivity and yet in human
compassion is one of those indefinable matters which can so often
separate the better judge from the equally trained, talented, and able
lawyer who is not able to function effectively in judicial robes.
As this enumeration is now completed, it becomes obvious that the
considerations cannot in themselves yield "correct" answers. It can
only be hoped that there has been here some isolation of various
guideposts which can be more explicit than such general statements
as "cases should be overruled when they are plainly in error," or
that they should be overruled only for "cogent reasons."
II.
The issue of stability and change in constitutional law has been
the subject of never-ending concern throughout our constitutional
history, as is made clear from the materials briefly surveyed above.
,That this issue is at this time in one of its periods of most active
ferment cannot be doubted. The current agitation over Supreme
Q ourt decisions has now extended for almost a decade, dating from.
the school integration case, Brown v. Board of Education.5 3 Proposed,
legislation designed to curb the power of the Supreme Court has been
taken seriously by the Congress.- Proposals for constitutional amend-
53. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. The Jenner Bill, S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), would.have taken from
1963]
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ments are now pending, having been passed by a few states, which
would completely alter the system of judicial review of legislation
and change our constitutional system in some of its most fundamental
aspects.55
There can be no complete analysis and evaluation of the current
constitutional issues here. But the constitutional decisions which
have brought about the current drive to remake our present constitu-
tional structure can speak to us on the issue of the proper role of
stability and change in constitutional law.
Decisions in four areas particularly have been subject to popular
attack. In each of these four areas there has been at least some
abandonment of precedent by the Court. In some instances, overruling
has been precise and has been stated by the Court. In other instances,
the alteration in constitutional law has been through the acceptable
common-law device of distinguishing away precedents which are
at least fairly close to controlling.
These four areas are: (1) the elimination of racial discrimination
under equal protection of the laws, particularly the abandonment of
the doctrine of "separate but equar' in the school integration and later
decisions; (2) developments in procedural due process of law which
have increased the protection of accused persons in criminal cases
(it is only an incidental fact that some of the criminal cases have in-
volved the prosecution of alleged subversives); (3) the application
of the principle of separation of church and state in the banning
of organized prayer and worship in public schools; and (4) the as-
sumption by the Court of the power to insist that voting rights not be
diluted by artificial and unrealistic legislative districting.
The first three of these categories of recent constitutional develop-
ments have a common core. In each instance, a minority individual
or group is finding protection against the majority in the judicial
enforcement of constitutional principles. The attack upon these de-
cisions could be summarized overall by recognizing that they contain
the implicit assertion that the Court has been too friendly to liberty.
Yet, stating the nature of the attack in these words reveals in stark
the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to hear cases involving charges of subversion and
involving the validity and application of the government's various personnel security
programs.
55. The three proposed amendments emanate from the Council of State Govern-
ments. One would establish a Court of the Union to review judgments of the United
States Supreme Court and to be made up of the chief justices of all the states. The
second would abolish all federal power over legislative apportionment. The third alters
the amending process of the Constitution to permit amendments to be enacted wholly
by the states, without any national power of approval. See Black, The Proposed
Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957 (1963).
All three proposals have been officially disapproved by the American Bar Association.
Editorial, Amending the Constitution, 49 A.B.AJ. 970 (1963).
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fashion the doubtful underpinning of the criticism. The phrase
commonly heard today, that "majorities have rights too," is in-
escapably correct. But the use of the phrase in context reveals that
those who characterize the current issues in these terms may not be
according proper strength to the traditional structures of American
freedom. A pure and unlimited rule by the majority would be a
dictatorship of the majority and could easily be as totalitarian and
as authoritarian as any dictatorship. And every time a minority right
is protected, the power of the majority to have its way is lessened.
This is the inescapable nature of freedom.
Our Constitution is designed to insure that the rights of individuals
and minorities shall not be subject to the dictatorship of the majority.
This most fundamental of American principles was effectively stated
by the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
speaking through Justice Jackson:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights, may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.56
While some recent decisions of the Court in these three areas may
be subject to valid criticism, the overall mood of the times would
appear to raise the question whether there is a dangerous press for
conformity that does not show a sufficient tolerance of the rights of
minorities, be they racial, religious, political, or even those individuals
who have been accused of crimes.
In evaluating each of the three areas of decisions under discussion
with respect to the stability-versus-change dilemma, pertinent con-
siderations are revealed which justify the abandonment of prior
constitutional doctrine.
It might be argued persuasively that the nation was not yet quite
ready for the sweeping impact of the school integration decision
and the others that have followed.57 The reluctance to implement the
decisions in many quarters and the turmoil which they have caused
might give backing to this belief. Yet, on the other hand, was it not
far too late in our national history to have had a Supreme Court
56. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
57. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 683 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956);




decision reaffirming a doctrine of doubtful validity when it was
created, and one which does not comport with the aspirations of the
American people as a whole, and of this nation as a leader of the
nations of the world? The matter of timing is of the utmost im-
portance in the development of the law. Yet the Court cannot exercise
full control over its timing. The cases were before the Court and had
to be decided. The fact that the dominant forces of the nation have
accepted the decisions reveals that it was far too late in our national
history and development to have reaffirmed the separate but equal
principle, which was rapidly becoming outmoded.59
In the developments of procedural due process of law, the traditions
of the common law would appear to demand changes designed to
increase the protection of those accused of crimes. This has been the
whole sweep of historical development in due process. Should an
indigent, unpopular defendant, who cannot obtain a lawyer, be forced
to go to trial in a serious criminal case and to attempt to defend him-
self without the aid of legal counsel?60 The question would answer
itself except for the realization that the right to counsel has been a
developing one, and that at an earlier period we did force such persons
to trial without the aid of counsel. But the fact that we used to do
things another way would also justify trial by battle or by ordeal, or
would justify all manner of failures to recognize other basic human
rights which modem enlightenment can reveal.
The same observations may be made, for example, on the issue con-
cerning the furnishing of a transcript to an indigent accused so that
he may appeal his conviction.6' Should the American people accept as
fundamental a principle that an accused should be able to appeal his
conviction only if he has the sizeable amount of money needed to buy
58. The doctrine of "separate but equal," created in a case involving public
transportation, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was never applied by the
Court to the ownership of property or place of residence. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra at 552, takes its place alongside his famous
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883), as a classic capturing of the
spirit of the fourteenth amendment.
59. The short answer to the assertion that racially separate educational facilities
could be acceptable was given by the Court in the Brown case when it said: "Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." 347 U.S. at 495. Warning of such a
holding had clearly been given in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), which
held that a newly-created Negro law school in Texas was not the equal of the University
of Texas Law School. One of the grounds given by the Court for its holding was the
advantage of going to a law school which had a distinguished group of alumni. How
can a new school create an equal group of alumni? An analysis of the factors the
Court relied upon in the Sweatt case reveals that they are largely inherent and are
virtually impossible to duplicate.
60. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
61. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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a transcript and pay other costs? The mere statement of the question
again seems to answer that the Constitution need not be found to step
aside to allow justice so to be based upon financial ability. The only
justification for the prior rule is the fact that we had not yet become
sensitive to the need for the change. Of course, perfect equality can
never be achieved in procedural due process of law. But when obvious
inequality can be corrected with a burden which seems no higher
than proper for the price of freedom, the tradition of the common
law has always been to correct the disparities.
And the principle would seem to be equally applicable if the person
accused is an alleged Communist or other subversive. The problems
of due process were most prominent in the minds of the framers of
the Bill of Rights. In a country dedicated to freedom, they can be no
less prominent in the minds of those who administer criminal justice
today. A danger equally serious to that of subversion is the adoption
of totalitarian methods to combat totalitarianism.
In the matter of the elimination of organized worship and prayer
in the public schools, we have less of a departure from prior decision,
although the claim is made that the American tradition as a religious
nation is being thwarted. 2 Actually, the use of the public schools for
regular religious ceremony has been a recent development in the
United States. Here we have nothing more than the Court reacting
to this recent development in making an initial application of the
constitutional principle against granting to religion an authoritative
role in secular affairs. Here is more clearly an instance where the
Court is attempting to play its established role of protecting the
minorities from a forming and strengthening majority, where the issue
is one of liberty.
The summary of the brief descriptions of these three areas of recent
controversial constitutional decision reveals that the claim that the
Court is abandoning prior constitutional law, that the Court is chang-
ing the meaning of the Constitution, actually is a form of objecting to
the decisions on their merits. In each instance, the claim that the
Court should not have changed prior law because the prior law had
been settled would seem not to stand up to the established right of
the Court to reconsider prior constitutional law, under the considera-
tions briefly set forth above. In all of these areas, it would appear
proper to say that there were factors which justified the Court in
reexamining prior doctrine. The issue as to whether the law should
62. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962). It can be argued that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952),
upholding a school released-time program for religious instruction, was prior contrary
authority. While the recent cases may indicate a shift in the Court's approach,
Zorach was readily distinguishable.
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have been changed when the doctrine was reexamined becomes, then,
one of evaluation of the strength and acceptability of the particular
decision. The point is that these decisions should be evaluated on
their own merit rather than be made subject to the assertion that they
are wrong because prior contrary authority existed in varying degrees.
This conclusion is not a surprising one. It is the nature of lawyers
and judges, indeed of all critics, to insist upon the doctrine of stare
decisis when the new decision is disapproved, but to ignore the
principle of stare decisis when the new decision is favorable to one's
point of view.6 Perhaps the most obvious example of this human
trait is to be found in the sweeping decision by the Supreme Court
in 1938 in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 6Here was a case that wiped out
a ninety-six-year-old principle that federal courts apply a federal com-
mon law. This was unquestionably a constitutional rule of the utmost
importance. Yet, when the ninety-six-year-old decision was re-
examined by the Court and determined to be wrong (perhaps with
less justification on change of circumstances than in some of the cases
discussed above) the new decision became the guiding constitutional
principle with little criticism. The issue rarely is whether the Court
can properly change a constitutional principle. The issue almost
always is whether the constitutional principle now adopted is as
acceptable, in the eyes of the beholder, as the earlier principle now
abandoned.
As to the fourth area of present controversial constitutional decision,
that involving legislative redistricting, the nature of the cases differ,
but similar principles apply. Baker v. Cart45 and the cases on re-
districting following it involve in the aggregate the protection of the
rights of the majority from subversion by entrenched minorities. This
fact seems to make rather surprising the attacks upon these decisions
by the same groups that attack the other decisions of the Court. It
would appear that the Court cannot satisfy anyone. It cannot protect
minorities, but it also cannot protect the majority.
The recognition that rights of voting and political participation may
be so weighted that individuals may be effectively eliminated as
voters would seem simply in the stating to justify the Court's re-
63. In dissenting in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944), Justice Roberts
wrote a rather vituperative opinion scolding the Court for freely disregarding and
overruling prior decisions. He said that constitutional adjudication was becoming like
"a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only." Id. at 669. Yet, twelve
years earlier Justice Roberts had joined in Justice Brandeis' famous opinion in the
Burnet case, 285 U.S. at 405, which constitutes the strongest justification in the Court's
history for a power to overrule prior decisionsi
64. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), holding
invalid the Georgia county unit voting system.
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examination of its prior reluctance to intrude. Nothing in the Consti-
tution indicates in any way that the right to vote and have one's
vote counted equally is not a right subject to protection through the
judicial process. The Court's previous self-restraint in this area has
been no more than a Court-created rule,16 and again, one which did
not imply that the Court had no concern. The Court's traditional pro-
tection of the right of racial minorities to vote reveals that it never
wholly abdicated responsibility in the election arena.67 Objection to
the Court's intrusion in this area can be seen, again, as objection to
the Court's undertaking to police this constitutional right rather than
that the Court has changed a prior rule.
On the issue of the merits in all of these cases of recent controversy
in constitutional litigation, reasonable men may differ. It is true that
the rights of minorities can be overprotected. No complete equality
can ever be achieved. But it can properly be observed that the issue
is one of balancing the interests of the individual or the group against
the interests of all. The balance is an intricate, delicate matter. In
making this balance, it should be accepted that the American tradition
is one of protecting the individual and the minority as far as can be
done without precipitating serious dangers to the well-being of the
nation and the people as a whole. Only by following this general
principle can this nation avoid falling into the trap that has character-
ized totalitarian nations throughout all history. The protection of the
rights of individuals and minorities against the will of the majority is
the manifestation of liberty. It is the characteristic of American free-
dom.
So it is that the issue of stability and change in constitutional law
usually resolves itself into the policy question whether the law can be
improved by change rather than into the question whether there is
or should be a right in the courts to make a change by overruling
prior authority. There are many safeguards built into the structure
which protect us from the abuse of the right to alter constitutional
law by court decision. The successful working of these safeguards
over approximately a century and three-quarters of American consti-
tutional history reveals their efficacy. In nearly all instances the issue
should be joined not on the right of the Court to overrule but on
the merits of the decision made.
It is not the constitution-amending power that plays the major
role in the American system in resolving the dilemma of stability and
change in constitutional law. It is the Supreme Court. And this is not
66. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
67. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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an innovation. It has been the guiding principle since the establish-
ment of the doctrine of judicial review. The role of the Supreme Court
in constitutional law has never been more succinctly, yet effectively,
stated than by Justice Reed in his address to the Pennsylvania State
Bar Association in 1938. Justice Reed said: "[Clonstitutional law is
more a matter of government than of rule-making."6
68. Reed, supra note 3, at 142.
